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The City Council of Philadelphia recently passed a curfew ordinance
which prohibits minors under seventeen from being in public places and
private business or amusement establishments during certain hours of the
day.' In the event of a violation it provides penalties against the child,
against the parent, and against the proprietors of establishments who allow
the minor to violate the curfew.2 The purpose of this Comment is to
examine the constitutionality of this ordinance. To attempt to do this in
the abstract is difficult since a legislative enactment may be constitutional
under one set of facts and not under another. However, the issues which
may be raised concerning the constitutionality of this ordinance shall be
considered, and a conclusion based on these issues will be presented. In
this Comment the following questions will be discussed:
1. "Section 3. Unlawful Conduct of Minors.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any minor to remain in or upon any public place
or any establishment between the hours of ten-thirty (10:30) o'clock P.M. and six
(6) o'clock A.M. of the following day, official City time, except that on Fridays
and Saturdays the hours shall be from twelve (12) o'clock midnight to six (6)
o'clock A.M.;
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any minor accompanied by
a parent, or a minor upon an errand or other legitimate business directed by such
minor's parent, or to any minor who is engaged in gainful lawful employment dur-
ing the curfew hours;
(c) Each violation of the provisions of this section shall constitute a separate
offense."
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
2. "Section 6. Enforcement and Penalties.
(a) Any police officer who finds a minor violating the provisions of this ordi-
nance shall obtain information from such minor as to his name and address, age,
and the name of his parent or parents. The minor shall thereupon be instructed
to proceed to his home forthwith .... ;
(b) Any parent who shall permit a minor to violate the provisions of this
ordinance after having received notice of a prior violation shall be fined not less
than five (5) dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each violation, together
with judgment of imprisonment not exceeding ten days if any fine imposed, together
with costs, is not paid within ten days of the date of imposition thereof;
(c) Any operator of an establishment and any agents or employees of any
operator who shall violate the provisions of this ordinance shall be fined not less
than twenty-five (25) dollars nor more than three hundred (300) dollars for each
violation, together with judgment of imprisonment not exceeding thirty days if any
fine imposed, together with costs, is not paid within ten days of the date of im-
position thereof."
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
(51)
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(1) Did the Council have authority to pass the ordinance?
(2) Does their ability to regulate on "police" matters cover the ordi-
nance at hand?
(3) Is the legislation violative of the state or federal constitutional
provisions guaranteeing rights of personal liberty?
I.
SOURCE OF POWER.
In 1929, the state legislature delegated a portion of its power to legis-
late by declaring that:
"The cities of the first class of this Commonwealth shall have
the power to make all such ordinances not inconsistent with or re-
strained by the constitution and laws of this Commonwealth as may
be expedient or necessary for the proper management, care and con-
trol of the city . . . and the maintenance of the peace, good govern-
ment, safety and welfare of the city . . . and the exercise of the
full and complete powers of local self-government in the matters of
police. . , . 1
The first section of the Philadelphia ordinance declares that the increase
in the crimes committed by minors has created a menace to the preserva-
tion of public peace, safety, health, morals, and welfare.4 By this legis-
lative finding, the council is indirectly saying that the purpose of the
ordinance is to maintain the peace, safety, and welfare of the city. This
ordinance is, therefore, self-declaratory of its intention to remain within
the grant of power given to the city council. The state had the power to
delegate its authority to legislate on this subject to the city council since
the Pennsylvania constitution states:
"Cities . . . may be given the right and power to frame and
adopt their own- charters and to exercise the power and authority of
local self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions as may
be imposed by the legislature." 5
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3451 (Supp. 1954).
4. "Section 1. Legislative Findings.
The Council of the City of Philadelphia finds as follows:
(a) An emergency has been created by a substantial increase in the number and
in the seriousness of crimes committed by minors against persons and property within
the City of Philadelphia, and this has created a menace to the preservation of public
peace, safety, health, morals, and welfare;
(b) The increase in juvenile delinquency has been caused in part by the large
number of minors who are permitted to remain in public places and in certain
establishments during night hours without adult supervision;
(c) The problem of juvenile delinquency can be reduced by regulating the
hours during which minors may remain in public places and in certain establishments
without adult supervision, and by imposing certain duties and responsibilities upon
the parents or other adult persons who have care and custody of minors."
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
5. PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
[VOL. 1.
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Since there is no state statute directly in conflict with the ordinance, and
since there is no apparent objection to concurrent jurisdiction in this
exercise of the police power, it is clear that the city council of Philadelphia
does have the authority and the power to legislate on this matter.
II.
THE QUESTION OF VAGUENESS.
The question of vagueness must be examined, for if the wording of
a statute or ordinance is so uncertain that there are no ascertainable stand-
ards of conduct, the law will be declared unconstitutional.6 In examining
the language of the Philadelphia curfew ordinance one finds that it gives
sufficient notice to all concerned. The terms used in the ordinance which
might have given difficulty in construction are adequately defined in section
two,7 and, hence, there is no need for men of common intelligence to guess
at the meaning of the ordinance. The ordinance is not open to the ob-
jection that it might punish without warning,8 since there is a requirement
of specific intent. This requirement of a specific intent is fulfilled as to
the parents and proprietors by the use of the term "knowingly" in defining
what shall be an offense by them.9 And, since knowledge may be imputed
when the means of acquiring knowledge exist, 10 this term, "knowingly,"
6. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
7. "Section 2. Definitions.
(a) 'Establishment' means any privately owned place of business carried on for
a profit or any place of amusement or entertainment to which the public is invited;
(b) 'Minor' means any person under the age of seventeen (17) years;
(c) 'Official City time' means Eastern Standard Time except from the last
Sunday in April to the last Sunday in September, it shall be Eastern Daylight
Saving Time;
(d) 'Operator' means any individual, firm, association, partnership, or corpora-
tion operating, managing, or conducting any establishment; and whenever used in
any clause prescribing a penalty the term 'operator' as applied to associations or
partnerships shall include the members or partners thereof and as applied to cor-
porations, shall include the officers thereof;
(e) 'Parent' means any natural parent of a minor, a guardian, or any adult
person, twenty-one years of age or over, responsible for the care and custody of
a minor;
(f) 'Public Place' means any public street, highway, road, alley, park, play-
ground, wharf, dock, public building or vacant lot;
(g) 'Remain' means to loiter, idle, wander, stroll, or play in or upon."
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
8. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
9. "Section 4. Unlawful Conduct of Parents.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any parent knowingly to permit any minor to remain
in or upon any public place or any establishment. ...
Section 5. Unlawful Conduct of Owners or Operators of Establishments.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any operators of an establishment or their agents
or employees knowingly to permit any minor to remain upon the premises ..
(Emphasis added.)
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
10. Cohen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 48 F. Supp. 1, (E.D. Pa. 1941); Smith v.
Industrial Acc. Commission, 174 Cal. 199, 162 Pac. 636 (1917).
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will not tie the hands of the police. They will be able to prosecute those
who should have known the law. However, even if parts of this ordinance
could be construed as vague, it should be remembered that there is a pre-
sumption that a legislative act is constitutional."
"All laws should be construed sensibly. General terms should
be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression
or an absurd consequence. It will, therefore, be presumed that the
legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid re-
sults of this character. The reason of such laws should prevail over
its letter." 12
Since the ordinance should not be declared invalid on the question of vague-
ness, we shall next consider the extent of the "police power."
III.
POLICE POWER.
The police power of a state
"embraces a whole system of internal regulation by which the state
seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses
against the state, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens
with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which
are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent
with a like enjoyment of rights by others." 13
To determine if the exercise of the police power is reasonable, two
tests are useful: (1) Is there an evil?; and (2) Do the means selected
have a real and substantial relation to the object to be attained? There
is an evil present in Philadelphia at the present time. There has been a
substantial increase in the arrests of minors.' 4 This fact is more appalling
when it is realized that the increase in serious crime is the more pro-
nounced. During 1953, arrests of boys under sixteen for the less serious
offenses of truancy and trespassing rose 7.2 per cent, while arrests for
more serious crimes such as murder, auto theft, and burglary increased
30.5 per cent.' 5 In the first eight months of 1954 there were 4200 crimes
11. Commonwealth cx rel. Elkin v. Moir, 119 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351 (1901)
Ex Parte Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 Pac. 896 (1906).
12. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 278, 280 (1869).
13. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 1223 (8th ed. 1927).
14. ANNUAL REPORT, CRIME PREVENTION ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, 2, 3,
11, 13 (1953).
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committed by members of the seven to seventeen group. Some defend
these figures by saying that only 2.5 per cent of the children of Philadelphia
are delinquents. This is true if children of all ages are included, but among
the thirteen to sixteen year old group, where most of the serious crimes
are committed, the percentage is much higher. 16 Courts have held that
there is enough "evil" in undue curiosity,17 driving,' 8 drinking, 19 and
peddling 20 to sustain legislation restricting these actions. If courts have
found an "evil" in these cases, they are very likely to find one in the Phila-
delphia juvenile delinquency situation.
Even though there may be a present evil, there must also be a reason-
able relation between the legislation and the evil which is sought to be pre-
vented.
"If therefore a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect
the public health, public morals or public safety has no real or substan-
tial relation to these objects or is a palpable invasion of rights secured
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge and
thereby give effect to the constitution." 21
The legislative determination of the extent of its power is not final or con-
clusive, and the courts may determine if a reasonable relationship exists
between the means used and the end to be accomplished.2 2  It has been
said, that in order to determine "reasonableness" the
"importance of public benefit which the legislation seeks to promote
is to be balanced against the seriousness of the restriction of private
right sought to be imposed. If a statute is directed to a public interest
of minor importance and yet imposes serious restrictions on guaran-
teed rights, the conclusion that it is unreasonable may be required.
16. Statistics obtained from Councilman Paul D'Ortona during interview Feb.,
1955:











17. Commonwealth v. Lovett, 4 Clark 5 (Pa. 1831), 6 PA. L.J. 226; Grand
Rapids v. Williams, 112 Mich. 247, 70 N.W. 547 (1897).
18. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 598
(1940); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932).
19. Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Gross-Cup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Pa. 1935),
aff'd, 298 U.S. 226 (1936) ; McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202, 75 S.W. 258 (1903).
20. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284, 19 At. 550 (1890).
21. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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Where the public benefit proposed is important, however, and the in-
terference with private rights is slight, the statute will be sustained." 2
In Philadelphia, 15 to 18 per cent of the complaints concerning juveniles
were received after 10:30 P. M. 24 There is no statistical data giving the
hours when the crimes were actually committed, but it is reasonable to
assume that the percentage of crimes committed after 10:30 P. M. was
greater than the 18 per cent figure. It is also to be remembered that
the crimes which are committed at night are generally the more serious
ones. Keeping the children home and off the streets could be found to
bear a substantial relation to the problem of increased juvenile crime.
Furthermore, in an interview, the originator of the curfew bill pointed to
something more than a decrease in crime to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the ordinance. Among other "results" cited were intangible ones such
as the segregation of the children from unhealthy older influences, like
the "easy money" crowd and the dope peddlers who are always looking for
new victims. 25  Thus, it is apparent that the prevention of juvenile
crime was not the sole object of this ordinance, but the child's general
welfare was also considered.
IV.
PERSONAL RESTRICTIONS.
Unless there is some violation of the guarantees of freedom of action,
due process, or equal protection of the laws found in the federal or state
constitutions, the ordinance should be declared valid. We shall examine
the three classes of people affected by this statute and see if there is an
infringement of their constitutional rights.
The Proprietor.
Generally a person has a right to use his property as he desires. How-
ever, this right is not absolute. If the use to which the property is put
creates an evil to the public, the regulation or prohibition of such uses by
the state is valid.2 6  It is thus widely held that the state or municipality
may prescribe the hours during which a business which is affected with
a public interest may operate.27  Under certain conditions it may also
23. Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 68, 184 At. 595, 599 (1936) ; like language
in Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 550, 551, 101 A.2d 634 (1954).
24. Interview with Sergeant Wade Liles, Juvenile Aid Bureau, Police Depart-
ment, Feb., 1955.
25. Interview with Philadelphia Councilman Paul D'Ortona, Feb., 1955.
26. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884) ; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S.
703 (1885); Crittenden v. Town of Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723 (1908)
Churchill v. Albany, 65 Ore. 442, 133 Pac. 632 (1913).
27. See Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 137 Pa. Super. 96, 8 A.2d 801, aff'd, 338 Pa.
457, 13 A.2d 67 (1939) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884) ; Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885) ; McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202, 75 S.W. 258
(1903) ; Crittenden v. Town of Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723 (1908) ; State
v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750 (1904) ; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 71
Pac. 737 (1903); Mehlon v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882 (1914).
[VOL. 1.
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss1/7
JANUARY 1956]
forbid certain persons from being served by such proprietors.2 8  The Phila-
delphia ordinance even covers businesses not affected with a public interest;
but regulation of such businesses is possible if the regulation is not aimed
toward the business itself, but rather toward the manner in which it is
being conducted. 29  The ordinance declares that a violation occurs when
owners, their agents, or their employees permit a juvenile to remain in
the establishment after the prescribed hours.30 By the use of the term
"knowingly," the council, as shown earlier, states that the act must be
done with knowledge. Hence the proprietor cannot complain that his rights
are transgressed without wrongful action on his own part or on the part
of his agents. As to the proprietors, therefore, this ordinance appears
valid.
The Parent.
The right of the parent to control the actions of his children is also
not an absolute right.8 1 When actions concerning the child have a relation
to the public good, the state may step in and countermand the dictates of
the parents. Because of this power, compulsory vaccination laws,
3 2 com-
pulsory education laws,83 laws demanding that an ill child be put under
the care of a physician, 4 as well as far-reaching statutes such as the Penn-
sylvania Juvenile Court Act,35 have all been upheld. The Philadelphia
ordinance is not dictating to the parent an over-all plan of discipline. It
is merely restricting the right of the parent to permit the child to be in
public places after certain hours without adequate adult supervision. Re-
membering that the parent's right of control is a qualified right and that a
good reason for the legislation exists, this is a legitimate action for the city
council. The parents are fined if their children violate the curfew. In
28. State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N.W. 1068 (1910); Laughlin v.
Tillamook City, 75 Ore. 506, 147 Pac. 547 (1915); State v. Baker, 50 Ore. 381, 92
Pac. 1076 (1907); Commonwealth v. Climenti, 89 Pa. Super. 195 (1926); But see
City of Madisonville v. Price, 123 Ky. 163, 94 S.W. 32 (1906).
29. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284, 19 Atl. 550 (1890).
30. "Section 5. It shall be unlawful for an operator of an establishment or their
agent or employees knowingly to permit any minor to remain upon the premises
of said establishment between, the hours of ten-thirty (10:30) o'clock P.M. and
six (6) o'clock A.M. of the following day, official time, except that on Fridays and
Saturdays the hours shall be from twelve (12) o'clock midnight to six (6) o'clock
A.M .... "
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
31. Ex Parte Alsdorf, 142 N.J. Eq. 246, 59 A.2d 610 (Ch. 1948) ; State v.
Sonier, 209 La. 138, 24 So.2d 290 (1945); Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid
Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949).
32. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); French v. Davidson, 143
Cal. 658, 77 Pac. 663 (1904); Duffield v. School Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 29 At. 742
(1894).
33. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); Commonwealth v. Edsell,
9 Northptn. 93, 13 Pa. Dist. 509 (1903).
34. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (Supp. 1954) ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 327
Pa. 136, 193 Atl. 258 (1937).
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order for the parents to be violators, however, they must knowingly permit
the child to frequent public places without legitimate reason. Hence, they,
like the proprietors, are being penalized, not for the action of the child,
but rather for their own neglect, which the home-rule municipality may reg-
ulate by appropriate legislation. In regard to the parent, therefore, the
ordinance may properly be found valid.
The Child.
"As a general rule, legislatures don't attempt to regulate the
morals or habits of individual citizens. When a positive breach of law
is reached or when the act of the citizen is such as to justify an im-
plication of an intended breach of law, then the criminal law may in-
terfere-but not till then." 36
In this ordinance, habits of individual citizens are being regulated. One of
these habits is walking on the public streets. The right of locomotion is
a precious one and safeguarded by both the federal and state constitutions.3 7
A city may regulate the use of its streets,3 8 but it may not do so in a way
that interferes with the personal liberty of the citizen as guaranteed to him
by our constitutions and laws.3 9 It has been held that if the use of the
streets is for a legitimate purpose, one can go where he pleases. 40 This
legitimate purpose includes business or pleasure.
"One may have lawful business on the street even though he is
there merely for exercise, recreation or any other proper purpose.
. Officers have no right to compel and to account for his actions
merely because he is on the street at an unusual hour." 41
Hence, it is clear that under ordinary circumstances the state may not pre-
vent an individual from making use of the streets, nor may it interfere
with one's choice of companions. 42  Consequently, under proper circum-
stances the ordinance might encounter constitutional difficulties. It is ap-
parent that one of the primary purposes of the ordinance is to prevent
youths from roaming the streets after the prohibited hours, and, further,
to put an end to the congregation of youths on street corners. However,
36. St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582, 585 (1873).
37. Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 167 Atl. 241, 242 (1933)
(dictum).
38. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 834, 49 S.W. 813 (1899); Shuck v.
Borough of Ligonier, 343 Pa. 265, 22 A.2d 735 (1941).
39. St. Louis v. Glover, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908); Shuck v. Borough
of Ligonier, 343 Pa. 265, 22 A.2d 735 (1941).
40. Beail v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951).
41. Beail v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1951).
42. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) ; Ex Parte Smith,
135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896) ; St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873).
[VOL. 1.
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in its regulation of the right of free locomotion, the curfew ordinance ap-
plies only to minors. It is true that "class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited." 43 However, "legislation which, in
carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the
sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, it is
not within the [14th] amendment." 44 "Minors are a class founded on
natural and extrinsic distinctions from adults and legislation peculiarly
applicable to minors . . . looking to their proper protection is not in-
valid as class legislation." 41 The special classification of minors has a
long history. In its inception, the jurisdiction over minors belonged to
the king as part of his powers as parens patriae to protect his young sub-
jects. This power was transferred to the Court of Chancery. Its juris-
diction is broad, comprehensive, and plenary. In legal proceedings of
whatever nature in which the personal or property rights of minors are in-
volved, the protective powers of a Court of Chancery may be invoked
whenever it becomes necessary to fully protect such rights.46  Because of
the special power to regulate the actions of minors, many laws pertaining
to them alone have been upheld on the ground that the classification was
not illegal. 47 The ordinance does not regulate the actions of those children
who are accompanied by adults or who are furthering some legitimate
business.48  This exemption is not arbitrary. If is necessary considering
the purpose of the ordinance and the history of curfew laws.
V.
CURFEWS.
There is a long history to curfew legislation. In the beginning its
purpose was to prevent fire in a period when most structures were made
of wood. The term itself conveys this idea since it is derived from the
French cauvre feu-to cover the fire. During the reign of Alfred there
was an ordinance that Oxford inhabitants should retire at the tolling of the
curfew bell, and there is evidence that this type of regulation was present
in many European countries during the same period. William I enacted
a curfew after his conquest to prevent nightly gatherings of the people
of England. There was so much opposition to it that Henry I discarded
it in 1103.4 9 The abstract idea of a curfew is as repugnant to twentieth
century Americans as it was to eleventh century Englishmen; but even
43. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1884).
44. Ibid.
45. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (1945) ; like senti-
ments expressed in Commonwealth v. Fisher,, 27 Pa. Super. 175, aff'd, 213 Pa. 48,
62 Ati. 198 (1905).
46. Richards v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry., 106 Ga. 614, 33 S.E. 193 (1889).
47. Ex Parte Weber, 149 Cal. 392, 86 Pac. 809 (1906) ; State v. Rose, 125 La.
462, 51 So. 496 (1910) ; Commonwealth v. Levi, 44 Pa. Super. 253 (1910).
48. See note 1 supra.
49. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 457 (4th ed. 1951).
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though there have been many curfews in this country, few have been con-
tested.
In 1898 a curfew law was passed in Texas which forbade those under
twenty-one from being on the streets at night unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian or in search of a physician. This was held invalid
in Ex Parte McCarver.50 The court looked into the reasonableness of
the ordinance since it was passed under general powers. The same Texas
court would not do this in the Philadelphia situation, since it stated that
if the ordinance had been passed under an express grant of the legislature,
the court would not be inclined to inquire into its reasonableness. One
of the objections to the ordinance was that there was no provision made
for legitimate errands or necessary business. This defect is cured in the
Philadelphia ordinance. The McCarver case also held thtt the ordinance
was paternalistic and that the prohibiting of those not doing wrong from
using the streets was not a legitimate function of the legislature.5' Con-
sidering the rise of juvenile delinquency, the number of children involved,
and the seriousness of their crimes, the same arguments would not carry
as much weight today. In 1898, perhaps the court was thinking of mere
mischief. Today the legislature is thinking of felonies.
An ordinance of Juneau, Alabama, which forbade all idle or dis-
solute persons or those xvith no visible means of support from wandering
around the streets after 11 P.M. was upheld. 52 There was little discussion
of restrictions on personal freedom, the court merely holding that unless
an ordinance is clearly oppressive and unreasonable it will not be declared
void. However, such broad laws have often been declared invalid.5" In
1945, Los Angeles had an ordinance similar to the present Philadelphia
one. This ordinance made it a crime for any parent or guardian to allow a
child under eighteen to remain or loiter on any street or public place
between 9 P.M. and 4 A.M. the following day unless accompanied by
one having custody of the child or unless the child had a permit.54 The
ordinance was held not to apply to those going to or from places of business
or amusement. It was declared valid; 5 the court stated that minors
are a special class, and, by way of analogy, compared this ordinance to
uniform vaccination laws for school children. Since the Philadelphia ordi-
nance forbids being on the street at all, as well as being in public amuse-
ment places, whereas the Los Angeles ordinance only forbade loitering, it
seems that the Philadelphia ordinance is more strict. However, further
amendments to the Los Angeles Municipal Code 56 forbid anyone under
eighteen to visit poolrooms or to be in a dancing academy between 6 P.M.
50. 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898).
51. Ibid.
52. Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 93 (9th Cir. 1916).
53. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
54. Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 3611 (Sec. 2), amended by Ordinances
Nos. 4256, 4464.
55. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945).
56. Los Angeles Municipal Code, Ordinance No. 77,000 (as amended to and
including Ordinance No. 101085), Chapter 4, Art. 5.
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and 12 midnight. They also regulate teen-age dances minutely and forbid
moving picture managers from allowing anyone under fourteen to remain
in the theater after 9 P.M. unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. If
the parent or guardian requests in writing that his child be forbidden ad-
mittance at any hour, the manager is obliged to obey the request. Hence,
although the basic curfew ordinance is less comprehensive than the Phila-
delphia one, the Los Angeles Code as a whole is more far-reaching, and
significantly, none of the sections on juveniles have been declared un-
constitutional.
A curfew has been in effect in East Moline, Illinois for several years. 57
Like the Philadelphia ordinance, it exempts from censure those minors
accompanied by a parent or guardian, those on legitimate errands di-
rected by one of the above, and those whose employment necessitates their
being on the prohibited premises after the specified hour. East Moline,
however, also exempts those who are "in an orderly manner actually on
[their] way to or from the homes of friends, school or church entertain-
ments or legitimate amusement houses." 58 The penalties for violation of
this ordinance are strong and it allows the police officer to arrest the child
without a warrant and hold him for a reasonable time. Although there
have been several arrests and several cases in which the parents were fined,
the constitutionality of the ordinance has never been questioned. It is
believed by Mayor Olson of East Moline that its legality is not likely to
be questioned since "public sentiment is behind it." " The Mayor also
states, "The police here do not use the ordinance as a means toward whole-
sale arrests but rather use it to discourage unnecessary loitering and mis-
chief making." ""
In addition to viewing the Philadelphia ordinance literally, it must be
remembered that judicial interpretation will play a great part when a case
testing the validity of the ordinance comes before the courts. Two Pnila-
delphia judges have already expressed their views on this subject. Judge
Vincent A. Carroll, Associate Judge of Philadelphia Common Pleas Court
No. 2, has said,
"It is my view, and I believe a sound legal view, that it is a
matter of settled law, and it seems to me basic and fundamental, that
in the police power of any municipality that there is included the power
to enact a curfew law to protect against crime in the hours of dark-
ness. . . . I do not think under any circumstances that a law of
this kind would violate constitutional rights and I think it impera-
tive." 61
57. East Moline Curfew Ordinance, originally passed Nov. 15, 1948, amended
June 7, 1954.
58. East Moline Curfew Ordinance, June 7, 1954, Section 1.
59. Letter from Charles Olson, Mayor of East Moline, Illinois, to Regina M.
Ward, March 4, 1955.
60. Ibid.
61. Hearing on Bill No. 718 Before Committee of the City Council of Philadel-
phia, Nov. 24, 1954.
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Judge Adrian Bonnelly of the Philadelphia Municipal Court is of the
opinion that the state did not completely occupy the field of supervision
of minors when they passed the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act. 2
Judge Bonnelly advocated the adoption of the original bill and is def-
initely in favor of the curfew law.6 When and if a borderline case comes
before them, they would be more likely to preserve the ordinance since
there is always a presumption of constitutionality. The severability clause 64
would also make it possible for them to strike down one section and still
preserve the rest of the ordinance.
In deciding whether or not this ordinance is constitutional, it must
be remembered that. even if one were to propose a hypothetical case in
which the facts would render it clearly unconstitutional, such a case is
not likely to come before the courts. Even though the terms of the ordi-
nance and the terms of the police directive are very clear, 5 there is the
attitude of the police department and the proponents of the bill to be con-
sidered. Former Deputy Commissioner of Police of Philadelphia, Albert
E. DuBois, has stated, "The ordinance is now law and our only job is to
enforce the law." 66 However, the police department is not looking for
wholesale arrests. Therefore if there is a school affair from which the child
is returning, a permit may be obtained.8 7 "Reasonableness" will be used
to determine whether the adult violators "knowingly" permitted a minor to
violate the curfew.68 In addition to these facts, we must recognize that
there is increasing evidence of a change in modern sociological considera-
tions. There are in America today influential schools of thought which be-
lieve that criminal behavior is learned behavior and that environment is of
the utmost importance; 69 that the community is at least as important
as the individual; 7  that juvenile offenders should not be overpro-
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §243 (Supp. 1954).
63. See note 61 supra.
64. "Section 7. Severability.
The provisions of this ordinance are severable and if any provision shall be held
illegal, invalid or unconstitutional, such illegality, invalidity or unconstitutionality
shall not effect or impair any of the remaining provisions. It is hereby declared
to be the intent of the Council that this ordinance would have been adopted if such
illegal, invalid or unconstitutional provision had not - been included herein."
Ordinance of Philadelphia City Council incorporating Bills Nos. 557 and 718. Ap-
proved January 26, 1955.
65. Procedural Directive (Temporary G) regarding violation of Curfew Ordi-
nance-Effective 12:01 A.M., January 31, 1955.
66. Interview with former Deputy Commissioner of Police Albert E. Du Bois,
Feb., 1955; confirmed as the still existing policy of the Commissioner's Office by
Chief Inspector Albert J. Trimmer, Sept. 28, 1955.
67. Interview with Police Captain Harry A. Fox, Feb., 1955.
68. Interview with former Deputy Commissioner of Police Albert E. Du Bois,
Feb., 1955.
69. NEW YORK COMMONWEALTH FUND, UNRAVELLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY(1950).
70. Judge Vincent A. Carroll quoted J. Edgar Hoover as saying, "Rights of
the individual are considered to be of the greatest importance until the activity of
the individual comes in conflict with the rights and interests of others. Law enforce-
ment officers must place community first, giving the individual importance a
secondary consideration." Hearing on Bill No. 718 Before Committee of the City
Council of Philadelphia, Nov. 24, 1954.
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